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 On April 18–19, 2008, the University of Pennsylvania Law School 
hosted a landmark conference entitled “The Enduring Lessons of the 
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Breakup of AT&T: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective.”1 This Conference 
was the first major event for Penn’s newly established Center for 
Technology, Innovation, and Competition (CTIC), a research institute 
committed to promoting basic research into foundational frameworks that 
will shape the way policymakers think about technology-related issues in 
the future.  
 The breakup of AT&T represents an ideal starting point for 
examining the major threads of telecommunications policy that have 
emerged over the past quarter century. Although the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) had already begun implementing 
many of the measures eventually incorporated into the consent decree that 
settled the case, commonly known as the Modification of Final Judgment 
(MFJ),2 the divestiture of AT&T’s local operating companies and the 
accompanying mandate to provide equal access to all long-distance and 
information service providers (ISPs) nonetheless represents the major 
milestone in the attempt to promote greater competition in the 
telecommunications industry.  
 The Conference brought together what one attendee called “the most 
distinguished group of telecommunications scholars ever assembled in one 
room.” The final conference lineup included two former FCC 
Commissioners, six former FCC Chief Economists, and four former Heads 
of Economic Analysis of either the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division 
or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Many of the panelists and 
moderators played key roles in shaping the policy either as members of the 
Justice Department staff that litigated the case or of the FCC staff charged 
with implementing the decree and integrating it into the regulatory regime 
governing telecommunications. The conference was attended by 
distinguished scholars as well as staff from the FCC and the FTC interested 
in telecommunications and antitrust policy. This unique combination of 
subject matter, presentations, and audience made for a very memorable 
event. 
I. LOOKING BACK AT DIVESTITURE: WHAT WORKED? WHAT 
DIDN’T? 
 The initial panel brought together a distinguished group of people 
who played key roles in the AT&T litigation. Their presentations offered 
differing opinions about whether the breakup of AT&T represented a 
 
 1. The conference program and webcasts of the panels are available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/institutes/ctic/conferences/att/index.html. 
 2. United States v. AT&T Co. (Modification of Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
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policy success or a policy failure, as well as which aspects of the breakup 
played out as expected and which aspects emerged as surprises. 
 Roger Noll, who helped develop the government’s case against 
AT&T, noted how that case sharpened the debate between, and improved 
the quality of research into, the optimistic and pessimistic visions of the 
perfectibility of regulation and whether antitrust can compensate for 
regulation’s shortcomings. In addition, the experience implementing the 
breakup of AT&T revealed that antitrust courts were no better at dealing 
with anticompetitive behavior than were regulators. Noll nonetheless 
suggested that the emergence of a competitive Internet and wireless 
industry would have been delayed if the court had not mandated equal 
access to and interconnection with the local telephone network.  
 Paul MacAvoy, who was one of the defense experts in the 
government’s case against AT&T, focuses on an anomaly of divestiture: 
the price of long-distance service relative to marginal cost (also known as 
the Lerner Index) surprisingly increased after divestiture and increased still 
further following the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(1996 Act). This fact suggests that these measures may not have been as 
successful in promoting meaningful competition in the telephone industry 
as generally thought.  
 Alfred Kahn, who served on AT&T’s National Advisory Board 
during the early stages of the case, observed that the vision of promoting 
competition through vertical disintegration underlying the breakup of 
AT&T was not realized until after the enactment of the 1996 Act. He 
believes this has been unfairly maligned. Kahn found the same issues are 
being replayed in the debates over network neutrality, which he called a 
“terrifying abomination.” The better solution, in Kahn’s opinion, is to 
promote the emergence of a third independent Internet access provider, 
most likely in the form of wireless. 
 Joseph Weber was the Director of Network Architecture Planning for 
AT&T. He helped craft the MFJ’s technical appendix, oversaw much of the 
actual implementation of the divestiture, and provided an overview of the 
regulatory and historical background for the case. He speculated that the 
real impetus for competition was technological change, which in turn 
suggested that competition would have emerged even if divestiture had 
never occurred. 
II. EQUAL ACCESS AS THE NEW REGULATORY PARADIGM: THE 
TRANSITION FROM RATE REGULATION TO ACCESS REGULATION 
 The breakup of AT&T was a landmark in the shift away from rate 
regulation, which grants customers access to the entire network, toward 
access regulation, which grants competitors access to portions of the 
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network. Another panel explored the successes and the new challenges 
posed by this new regulatory paradigm, examining its workability, its 
impact on static and dynamic efficiency, and the extent to which it now 
serves as a model for other countries and industries. 
 Glen Robinson, an FCC Commissioner during the early stages of the 
government’s suit against AT&T, noted that both the MFJ and the 1996 
Act reflected the belief that new entrants would use access to the 
incumbent’s network as a stepping stone to full-fledged, facilities-based 
competition. The mounting empirical evidence indicates that this dynamic 
has failed to materialize. He further observed that the reduction in 
regulation that many thought would accompany the shift to a new 
regulatory paradigm based on access regulation has also failed to 
materialize. 
 Tim Wu offered a distinction between two types of access mandates. 
On the one hand are zero-price rules, which include the rules governing 
customer premises equipment (CPE), the regime established by Computer 
II,3 and the network neutrality conditions imposed on the AT&T/BellSouth 
merger. On the other hand are access fee rules, which include long-distance 
access charges and unbundled network element (UNE) access under the 
1996 Act. Wu argues that zero-price rules are more effective in creating 
markets that operate without requiring any cooperation from the 
incumbent.  
 As a presenter, I pointed out that the current approach to access 
regulation fails to take into account the different ways particular networks 
are configured or to take into account the interactions among network 
components that allow networks to compensate for unexpected changes in 
demand by rerouting traffic through different portions of the network. 
Presenting this joint work with Daniel Spulber, I offered a model of 
network regulation based on the branch of mathematics known as “graph 
theory” that captures the way in which networks constitute complex 
systems. This approach holds the promise of unifying the different types of 
access to local telephone networks into a single, overarching framework 
that can provide insights into optimal network configuration, cost, capacity, 
and reliability, as well as a basis for determining the likely impact of 
different types of access mandates. 
 Former FCC Chief Economist Gerald Faulhaber observed that access 
regulation requires the continued imposition of rate regulation for an 
extended period of time. He also offered a theory of successful access 
regulation that depends on one of two conditions being met. Either the 
 
 3. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986). 
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access interface must be simple and easy to monitor or the incumbent must 
not compete directly with new entrants in downstream markets. 
III. KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD A. 
POSNER 
 In his keynote address, Judge Richard Posner described the role he 
played both as General Counsel of President Johnson’s Task Force on 
Communications Policy—which, as Roger Noll noted, initiated the analysis 
that established the groundwork for the government’s case against 
AT&T—and as a consultant to AT&T during the early stages of the case. 
His witty observations and reflections yield the type of insights into how 
AT&T’s internal culture and decision making shaped its response to the 
case that only a person who was actually there can provide. 
IV. STRUCTURAL SEPARATION IN DYNAMIC MARKETS: 
LESSONS FOR THE INTERNET, LESSONS FOR EUROPE 
 Recent developments, most notably the Microsoft litigation, the 
Verizon/MCI and SBC/AT&T mergers, and the European Commission’s 
review of its e-communications regulatory framework have given new 
emphasis to debates over the effectiveness of structural separation as a 
remedy. This panel explored the insights that the breakup of AT&T 
provides into the relative merits of structural separation and vertical 
integration, as well as the unique problems that structural separation poses. 
 Joseph Farrell, who served as FCC Chief Economist during the 
implementation of the 1996 Act and as Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for Economic Analysis for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, 
suggested that the complexity of the economics of vertical integration may 
make it hard for business executives to discern the true incentives. He 
further suggested that modern competition policy may have become a bit 
too doctrinaire in focusing on incentives, and in so doing, has overlooked 
the potential value of openness, diversity, and imagination. 
 Eli Noam offered insight into the current debate over structural 
separation taking place in Europe by presenting data comparing the 
performance of the U.S. telecommunications industry to Canada’s, which 
achieved similar results without undergoing a breakup of the incumbent. 
The similarity of outcomes raises serious questions about the necessity and 
efficacy of structural separation as a remedy.  
 Former FCC Chief Economist Michael Riordan discussed the current 
proposal to implement universal service through reverse auctions, 
particularly the concern that the auction winner might need access to the 
incumbent’s network should the incumbent lose the auction. The model he 
proposed showed how structural separation can facilitate nondiscriminatory 
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access to the incumbent’s network and can blunt the distorting effects of 
stranded costs. In addition, the model indicates that a provision of advanced 
services can reduce the need for universal service subsidies. 
 Michael Salinger, who recently served as Director of the FTC’s 
Bureau of Economics, offered a broad survey of previous efforts to impose 
structural separation, identifying a handful of success stories and a larger 
number of failures. In his opinion, the success of structural separation 
depended not on regulators’ ability to promote entry into the portions of the 
industry in which competition had newly become possible, but rather on 
their ability to exercise continuing oversight over the portion of the 
industry that was likely to remain noncompetitive. Salinger applied this 
analysis to the network neutrality debate, opining that the difficulty of 
regulating an industry as new and complex as broadband made regulatory 
intervention inadvisable. 
V. FROM THE MFJ TO TRINKO: THE ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 
DOCTRINE AND THE PROPER PROVINCES OF ANTITRUST AND 
REGULATION 
 The Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Trinko4 called into question 
two of the MFJ’s central premises: first, the propriety of invoking Section 2 
of the Sherman Act5 to mandate access to telecommunications networks, 
and second, that antitrust courts can play a constructive role in overseeing 
the telecommunications industry. The participants in this panel offered a 
range of views regarding how much room is left for antitrust courts after 
Trinko. 
 Daniel Spulber, presenting another aspect of the research project that 
we are pursuing together, laid out a five-part system for classifying 
different types of access based on the graph-theory-inspired approach 
discussed above. In addition, he analyzed access mandates through the 
Coasian theory of the firm, showing how access mandates compel the 
externalization of functions that would more efficiently be provided within 
the boundaries of the firm. He then employed this framework to analyze 
recent efforts to use the antitrust laws to mandate access to 
telecommunications networks, showing how different types of access have 
implications for network design, operating costs, and transaction costs. 
 Michael Katz, former FCC Chief Economist and former Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Economic Analysis for the Justice 
Department’s Antitrust Division, argued that antitrust authorities still have 
a role in telecommunications policy after Trinko, particularly in the areas of 
 
 4. See Verizon Comm. Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 5. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, sec. 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 
U.S.C. § 1-7 (2000)). 
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policing price fixing and reviewing mergers. He then asked what would be 
a sensible division of labor between the FCC and the antitrust enforcement 
authorities. Katz argued in favor of centralizing merger review authority in 
the antitrust enforcement agencies to the exclusion of the FCC, pointing to 
the antitrust authorities’ greater emphasis on the analysis provided by 
economists, their greater ability to develop more extensive factual records, 
their greater insulation from political pressures, as well as the greater 
clarity of the legal standard being applied, the stronger degree of judicial 
oversight, the presence of more rigid time constraints, and the limits on 
remedial discretion.  
 Timothy Brennan, who worked on the government’s case against 
AT&T, argued that Trinko signals a shift away from viewing antitrust and 
regulatory enforcement as complements in favor of viewing them as 
substitutes, in which one operates to the exclusion of the other. Indeed, he 
speculates that the MFJ would not have been allowed to proceed had 
Trinko been the law at the time. Despite his sympathies for the continued 
regard of antitrust and regulation as complementary, Brennan questioned 
whether the clash of institutional cultures between the antitrust authorities 
and the FCC would permit a coherent complementary enforcement policy 
to emerge.  
 Former FCC Chief Economist Howard Shelanski examined the range 
of possible readings of Trinko, concluding that it creates a presumption 
against antitrust enforcement in regulated industries where a statute 
provides for continuing oversight and enforcement by a regulatory agency. 
The Trinko opinion is less clear about how to determine when an industry 
is sufficiently regulated to trigger the presumption against antitrust 
enforcement. This ambiguity raises the danger that the presence of a 
nominal regulatory regime might insulate carriers from meaningful scrutiny 
under either antitrust or regulation. 
VI. REGULATION BY CONSENT DECREE: LESSONS FOR 
MICROSOFT AND BEYOND 
 Commentators have long debated the efficacy of consent decrees. 
Some have focused on the relative merits of structural and behavioral 
relief. Others have suggested that consent decrees represent a way for 
defendants to evade liability even when they have violated the antitrust 
laws. Still others suggest that consent decrees allow the government to 
impose liability even when no antitrust violation has occurred. This panel 
employed the consent decrees settling the cases against AT&T and 
Microsoft6 as lenses to explore the various sides of these debates. 
 
 6. United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. A. No.  98-1232(CKK), 2002 WL 31654530 
(D.D.C., 2002), as modified by U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 2006 WL 2882808 (D.D.C., 2006).  
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 Richard Epstein contended that the distinction between conduct and 
structural remedies is somewhat overdrawn, illustrated by the extensiveness 
of the conduct requirements needed to implement the supposedly structural 
remedy imposed by the MFJ. A better way to evaluate the choice of 
remedies is through examining the fit between the competitive harm proven 
and the remedy imposed. Thus, the fact that the core problem raised by the 
case was AT&T’s refusal to interconnect with emerging long-distance 
carriers like MCI suggests that the same results could have been 
accomplished without divestiture simply by imposing an interconnection 
requirement. 
 Robert Crandall observed that his comprehensive survey of structural 
remedies had turned up only one instance in which structural remedies had 
apparently yielded welfare benefits: the breakup of AT&T. Even in that 
case, the fact that Canada and the EU achieved reductions in long-distance 
prices similar to those that occurred in the United States simply by 
imposing equal access without mandating divestiture suggests that the same 
benefits might have been achieved without imposing a structural remedy. 
Crandall also presented data proposing that the consent decree imposed in 
the Microsoft case had very little impact on the financial performance of 
Microsoft or its competitors, which raised questions about the benefits of 
antitrust intervention in that case as well. 
 Daniel Rubinfeld, who served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
for Economic Analysis for the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division 
during the Microsoft case, noted that the Department strongly favors 
structural remedies over conduct remedies. Indeed, he found his skepticism 
of conduct remedies borne out by the difficulties that the current 
Administration was facing in monitoring Microsoft’s compliance with the 
conduct remedies in the consent decree. Given the lack of bite in the 
conduct remedies imposed, Rubinfeld expressed scant surprise that the 
Microsoft consent decree had little effect. He would have preferred 
imposing a structural remedy, arguing that it would have yielded 
substantial benefits in increased innovation. 
 Philip Weiser noted that platform industries suffer from a 
commitment problem, with network owners’ reluctance to incur sunk costs 
being matched by complementary service providers’ fear of retroactive 
opportunism. He suggested that such problems are best addressed through 
disclosure, standard setting, and nondiscrimination norms, but argued that 
the case for restricting vertical integration was weak. He also presented a 
case for reforming the process for reviewing telecommunications mergers 
in a way that makes antitrust and regulatory oversight more 
 
The complete anti-trust case filings can be found on the Department of Justice webpage at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_index.htm. 
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complementary. Under this approach, the regulatory agencies would defer 
to the competition policy analysis of the antitrust enforcement authorities, 
while the antirust authorities would consult with the FCC before imposing 
any conduct remedies.  
VII. THE FUTURE OF INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION 
 The breakup of AT&T gave newfound importance to debates over 
intercarrier compensation that now encompass new services, such as voice 
over Internet protocol (VoIP) as well as traditional telecommunications. 
This panel discussed how these compensation regimes will be shaped in the 
future and how reform of the current system of intercarrier compensation is 
being constrained by the political support for universal service.  
 Gerald Brock, who served both as a consultant to the Justice 
Department during the government’s case and as Chief of the Common 
Carrier Bureau during the implementation of the MFJ, reviewed the 
controversies over intercarrier compensation spawned by divestiture, with a 
particular emphasis on how political constraints prevented the 
implementation of a more economically rational system. Although he was 
once optimistic about major intercarrier compensation reform, he is now 
less so. Given the political infeasibility of abolishing access charges 
altogether, Brock suggested that policymakers should focus on the more 
limited goal of eliminating the opportunities for opportunistic behavior by 
rural carriers created by the current access charge regime. 
 Former FCC Chief Economist Simon Wilkie offered a concrete 
proposal for eliminating the incentives for arbitrage by small rural carriers 
caused by the current access charge regime. Under his proposal, the reverse 
auction currently contemplated for distributing the direct universal service 
subsidy for high-cost areas would be expanded to include the implicit 
subsidy represented by the above-cost portion of long-distance access 
charges. Carriers participating in the reverse auction would have to agree to 
interconnect with other carriers through bill-and-keep arrangements, which 
would eliminate the incentive for opportunistic behavior. Carriers not 
participating in the reverse auction would no longer benefit from 
mandatory interconnection. 
 James Speta explored a series of paths through which 
telecommunications reform might occur. He viewed the unintentionalist 
paths—such as allowing the system to collapse from its own weight or 
relying on the combination of greed and unintended consequences—as 
unlikely to yield significant results. He also expressed skepticism that a 
heroic regulator or legislator could accomplish reform directly and found 
that the downsides of a bargain, in which the biggest loser is compensated 
10 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61 
for its losses, outweighed the upsides. The best hope lay, in Speta’s 
opinion, in a sneaky regulator or legislator pursuing incremental change. 
 Kevin Werbach challenged the premise of the panel, speculating that 
future debates may focus neither on intercarrier relationships nor on 
compensation. With digital convergence placing less emphasis on calls, the 
focus will shift towards relationships among providers of all types of 
network services rather than simply carriers, which in turn will encompass 
a much broader array of companies. Furthermore, these relationships may 
not involve compensation should the terms of interconnection become 
dominated by bill-and-keep arrangements. 
*** 
 All in all, the panels and discussions made for a very memorable 
weekend. CTIC and all of the conference participants are grateful to the 
Federal Communications Law Journal for agreeing to publish all of the 
presentations that developed into formal papers, along with an additional 
paper authored by Jerry Hausman, J. Gregory Sidak, and Timothy Tardiff 
that was originally scheduled to be part of the conference, but was not 
presented due to a last-minute conflict. We believe that the presentations at 
the conference and the resulting articles published here represent an 
important contribution that will provide insights for both scholars and 
policymakers for years to come. 
